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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------0-----LOYE E. MARTINDALE, DARWIN
W. LARSON, CAROL W. CLAY;
LOGAN CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; and THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF LOGAN CITY,
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Respondents,
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MAYOR DESMOND L. ANDERSON,
CITY ATTORNEY J. BLAINE
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Defendants and
Appellants.

------0-----BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

------0-----NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein the
Plaintiffs sought an adjudication in regard to the respective
powers of the Municipal Council and of the Mayor under the
council-mayor optional form of municipal government.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment holding
that the mayor has only the powers specifically granted him by
statute and that'all other powers, including the executive powers
not specifically granted to the mayor, are vested in the municiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
pal council.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant seeks an adjudication by this
court that under the statutes of the State of Utah in a municipal
government organized and established under the optional form
known as the council-mayor form, all executive power is vested
in the mayor and all legislative power in the municipal council.
The appellant also seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling
in regard to specific matters where such rulings are based on
erroneous decisions as to the scope of the mayor's power.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As amicus curiae it would be improper to present a
substantive statement of the facts surrounding this matter.
However, a brief statement is offered to more precisely state
the identity and interest of amicus.
Amicus are members of the 42nd Legislature of the
State of Utah.

The Honorable Robert O. Bowen and Willard Hale

Gardner are co-chairmen of the Joint Intergovernmental Relations
Committee of the Legislature.

The Honorable Karl N. Snow, Jr.,

was one of the sponsors of Senate Bill No. 179 (Chapter 33,
Laws of Utah 1975) and Senate Bill No. 204 (Chapter 48, Part 12,
Laws of Utah 1977), the subject legislation in this controversy.
Amicus have no personal interest in the outcome of
this matter, but are interested in it for two reasons:
1.

To see, if possible, that the legislative intent

is presented to this Court for its consideration so that this
intent may be carried out; or
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2.

If the subject legislation is not presently

compatible with the legislature's intent, to obtain a judicial
clarification of the legislation's failings so that they might
be corrected in accord with this intent.
I

LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS THE
PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The individual functions of the legislature and the
judiciary are, of course, well established and for the most
part separate functions.

Separate should not, however, neces-

sarily be construed to mean independent, for in large part,
their functions are dependent on one another and, in fact, such
interdependency is necessary for a full compliment of our laws.
It is to that interdependency that this matter has now arrived.
The legislature has endeavored to put its intent into statutory
language, but a question has arisen about the meaning of its
language.
The Court, in its considerations, must determine the
meaning of the statutes in question, but it is not without
substantial judicial precedents for guidance in performing its
task.

This Court has often stated the rule of construction

which it applies.

In Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah

2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966), this Court stated:
"The fundamental consideration which
transcends all others in regard to the interpretation and application of a.statute ~s:
What was the intent of the legislature?
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See also Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967);
Allen v. Board of Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P.2d 756 (1951);
Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d 766 (1951); and
Taft v. Glade, 144 Utah 435, 201 P.2d 285 (1948).
In determining the legislature's intent, there are
certain factors that may justifiably be viewed by the Court
for assistance along the way.

While such factors are not

necessarily dispositive of the issue at hand, they may be of
great value in interpreting intent.

In that regard, this Court

in Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972)
recently stated:
• . if there is any doubt or uncertainty as to such (legislation), its origin,
history and pu~pose can be examined to
determine its correct interpretation and
application."
See also Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 102 Utah
340, 130 P.2d 663 (1942).
Information regarding such fundamental aspects of the
subject legislation is sparce at the lower court level and
amicus respectfully submits that such information should be
considered by the Court in determining the legislation's
history, intent and objective.

Such practice has commonly been

employed by this Court in its efforts to fulfill its judicial
function.

In Continental Telephone Company v. State Tax

Commission, 539 P.2d 447 (1975), this Court stated:
"Where there is doubt or uncertainty
concerning the interpretation and application of statutes, they should be viewed in
light of conditions and necessities which
they are intended to meet and the objects
sought to be obtained thereby."
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See also Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (1975);
Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (1974); Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah
2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 (1966); Johnson v. State Tax Commission,
17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966); State Land Board v. State
Department of Fish and Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707
(1965); State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965);
Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965); Peay v.
Board of Education of Provo City School District, 14 Utah 2d
63, 377 P.2d 490 (1962); State v. Hunt, 13 Utah 2d 32, 368 P.2d
261 (1962); State v. Salt Lake City Public Board of Education,
13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P.2d 468

(1962); Basich v. United States

Smelting, Refining and Mining Company, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d
612

(1948); and Western Auto Transport v. Reese, 104 Utah 393,

140 P.2d 348 (1943).
II

THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO PROVIDE
A STRONG MAYOR FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Levels of local government have historically been the
laboratory for political and governmental experimentation.
has been the case in Utah.

Such

In spite of that opportunity for

innovation, certain trends have surfaced.

As set forth in one

recognized treatise:
"The disposition to increase the powers
of the mayor and thus center the responsi-.
bility in him has been somewhat preval7n~ in
this country in the development o~ m~nici~al
organization. The fundamental principle is
that the mayor should have ample power to
control fully the administration of all
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municipal affairs.
In addition to the veto
power, which is his chief agency in legislation, many charters give him the sole
right to appoint and virtually unrestricted
power to suspend or remove subordinate
officials or heads of departments. The
tendency seems to be not so much to increase
the legislative power of the mayor, but to
separate the legislative power from administrative functions, vesting the legislative
power in a legislative department and the
administrative functions in the executive
branch composed of the mayor and such boards
or departments as may be deemed advisable."
McQuillin Mun. Corp. (3rd Ed.) Section 918.
Such trend seems to have been exhibited in Utah.
Prior to 1959, cities of the first and second class were under
legislative direction to be governed by boards of commissioners
consisting of a mayor and a stated number of commissioners.
The powers and duties of the mayor were, for all intents,
identical to those of the commissioners.

However, the legis-

lature, in 1959, saw fit to allow cities the opportunity to
experiment with a different form of city government, i.e.,
the Strong Mayor Form of Government.

(Chapter 20, Laws of

Utah 1959, Sections 10-6-76 et seq. repealed by Chapter 33,
Laws of Utah 1975.)

The duties of the commission and mayor

were set forth in Section 10-6-79, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which read:
"10-6-79. The board of commissioners
in cities of the first and second class
shall be the legislative bodies of such
cities and as such shall pass ordinances,
appropriate funds, review city administration and shall perform all duties that may
be required of them by law. They shall
not, however, exercise any administrative
or governing authority conferred upon the
mayor. The mayor of a city shall be the
chief executive officer and shall see that
all laws and ordinances are faithfully
executed."
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This language echoes effectively the separation of
the powers of government in accord with doctrine of the French
political philosopher Montesquieu with its accompanying scheme
of checks and balances which has been incorporated in the
structure of government, both federal and state.

Such a dis-

tinct division and distribution of power and responsibility
in which each officer acts to the full extent within his sphere
is the very basis of the checks and balance theory of government.
The trend established by the Strong Mayor Form of
Government, supra, continued when, in 1975, the legislature
enacted the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act.
(Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1975, Sections 10-6-103, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, et seq. repealed by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah
1977).

One of those options given by said act was the council-

mayor form which provided in Section 10-6-113, Utah Code
Annotated 1953:
"10-6-113. The municipal council of
a municipality adopting an optional form
of government provided for in this act
shall be the governing body of that municipality and shall pass ordinances, appropriate funds, review municipal administration, and perform all duties that may be
required of them by law."
As can be seen, the council's power is identical to
that of the commission's under the Strong Mayor Form of
Government, supra.

On the other hand, the power of the mayor,

as set forth in section 10-6-123, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
was as follows:
"10-6-123.
In the optional form of
government known as the council-mayor form,
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the mayor shall be the chief executive and
administrative officer of the municipality.
He shall have the power and duty to:
(1)
Enforce the laws and ordinances
of the municipality.
(2)
Execute the policies adopted by
the council.
(3)
Appoint and remove administrative
assistants, including a chief administrative officer, as he shall deem necessary;
with the advice and consent of the council
appoint department heads; remove department
heads; and appoint and remove all other
officers, commissions, boards, and committees
of the municipality, except as may otherwise be specifically limited by law.
(4)
Exercise control of all departments, divisions, and bureaus within the
municipal government.
(5) Attend all meetings of the council
with the right to take part in all discussions and the responsibility to inform
the council of the condition and needs of
the municipality and make recommendations
and freely give advice to the council,
except that the mayor shall not have the
right to vote in council meetings.
(6)
Appoint a budget officer for the
purpose of conforming with the requirements
of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures
Act (chapter 10 of Title 10) [section
10-10-23 et seq.]; and in all other respects
fulfill the requirements of that act.
(7)
With the advice and consent of
the council appoint a qualified person to
each of the offices in cities of recorder,
treasurer, engineer, and attorney and, in
towns, town treasurer and town clerk;
create such other off ices as may be deemed
necessary for the good government of the
municipality, and make appointments to
them; and regulate and prescribe the powers
and duties of all other officers of the
municipality, except as provided by law
or by ordinance.
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.
(8)
Furnish the municipal council
with a.report, periodically as determined
by ordinance, setting forth the amounts of
all budget appropriations, the total disbursements to date.from these appropriations,
and the amount of indebtedness incurred or
c~ntrac~ed a~ainst each appropriation
(including disbursements and indebtedness
incurred and not paid) and the percentage
of the appropriations encumbered to date
which reports shall be made available fo;
public inspection.
(9) .Perform s~ch other duties as may
be pre~cribed by this act or may be required
by ordinance not inconsistent with this act.
Again, in 1977, the legislature ratified the strong
mayor concept.

In Section 10-3-1209, Utah Code Annotated 1953,

it provides for the adoption of a council-mayor form and states:
"10-3-1209. The optional form of
government known as the council-mayor form
vests the government which adopts this
form in two separate, independent, and
equal branches of municipal government;
the executive branch consisting of a mayor
and the administrative departments and
officers; and the legislative branch
consisting of a municipal council . . . "
(Emphasis added)
The functions of the municipal council are to be
found in Section 10-3-1210, Utah Code Annotated 1953, again a
verbatim adoption of earlier law.

(See the Optional Forms of

Municipal Government Act and the Strong Mayor Form of Government
Act, supra.)

As with the powers and duties of the council,

the powers of the mayor, under this most recent enactment, are
identical with earlier law, Section 10-3-1219, Utah Code
Annotated 1953.
Act, supra.)

(See Optional Forms of Municipal Government

It cannot be gainsaid that the legislature, over

recent years, has unqualifiedly announced its intent to have a

-9-
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strong mayor type of government available to those cities
electing that option.

It is equally clear that the strong

mayor form envisions " . . . separate, independent and equal
branches . • . " not unlike that which operates on a federal and
state level.
III

THE STRONG MAYOR FORM OF GOVERNMENT
CREATES SEPARATE, INDEPENDENT AND EQUAL
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT, EACH WITH ITS PARTICULAR
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The separation of powers doctrine is deed-rooted in
American governments.

Historically our federal system has

adopted this concept and the same has been applied in this
state.

In Kimball v. City of Grantsville, 19 Utah 368, 57

P.l (1899), the Court reflected upon the matter and advised:
"The powers of state government were,
by organic law, divided into three distinct
departments,--the legislative, executive,
and judicial,--and no person or persons
whose duty it is to exercise the functions
of one department can exercise any powers
belonging properly to either of the others,
except in cases expressly authorized by
the constitution. The legislative power
was vested exclusively in the legislature,
and it is within its sphere to make the
laws for the government of the state. The
power to execute the laws was referred to
the executive department, and the power to
declare what are the laws to the judiciary.
The departments are all upon the same
plane; all are co-ordinate branches of the
same government; each absolute within its
own sphere, except as limited or controlled
by the constitution of this state or of
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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t~e ?nited States.
The apportionment of
~ist7nct power to one department of itself

impl7es an inhibition against its exercise
by either of the other departments."
See also Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734
(1936) and Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245,
117 p. 2d 298 (1941).
Unfortunately, the doctrine is not as well documented
in municipal government as it is in federal and state law.

The

recent change from the commission form to the mayor-council
form obviates the need for questioning this parcity of judicial
guidance in determining the relative parameters of powers
between the executive and legislative branches of municipal
government.

However, we are given certain guidance by the

statutes themselves.

In Section 10-6-123, Utah Code Annotated

1953, and its successor, Section 10-3-1219, Utah Code Annotated
1953, we find that the mayor " . . . shall be the chief executive
and administrative officer . . . ".

By virtue of that declaration,

the mayor is empowered to perform certain administrative functions and these functions, in accordance with the separation of
powers doctrine, are to be performed essentially unencumbered
by legislative restraint.

The ultimate issue of what is or is

not an administrative function, must, of course, be determined.
In Keigley v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480 (1939) this Court
in citing Whitbeck v. Funk, 140 Or. 70, 12 P.2d 1020 held:
"The general rule has been stated as
follows:
'Acts constituting a declaration
of public purposes and making provisions
of ways and means of accomplishment may
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be generally classified as calling for the
exercise of legislative power."
The Court continued by citing Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 3
P.2d 799:
"In determining whether the ordinance
in question was legislative or administrative we notice that the authorities in the
books are in accord that actions which
relate to subjects of a permanent or
general character are considered to be
legislative, while those which are temporary
in operation and effect are not."
See also 5 Utah L. R. 414 (1957).
As can be seen from the criteria established by this
Court, the character of the particular function must be viewed
on an individual basis.

The powers involved herein are, for

the most part, powers of either an inherent nature or those
flowing from those stated powers.
ly in the laws of this state.

They cannot be found absolute-

Amicus submits that appellant

has fully treated the particular issues of administrative visa-vis legislative prerogatives in a correct and comprehensive
manner and accordingly appellant's Points II and IV are adopted
by amicus as their own.
CONCLUSION
The primary obligation of the Court in matters of this
nature is, whenever possible, to preserve the intent of the
legislative enactment.

The history of our governmental processes

has been one of separation of powers, each department of government carrying on its particular function in harmony with, but
distinct from, each other department.

This concept is the very
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basis for the strong mayor form of government.

Utah has placed

itself in the modern flow of municipal government by permitting
the cities to opt for a strong-mayor form.

This concept has

been continued through three different pieces of legislation.
This optional form of municipal government inherently consists
of an executive branch, i.e., the mayor who is also the chief
administrative officer charged with performing those functions
of a transitory nature.

The particular issues involved herein

are matters within the purview of the administrative department
and accordingly are not subject to council interference.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

17"'f'll

day of February,

1978.
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Legislative General Counsel
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Associate Legislative General Counsel
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
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